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Both because of its bearing on national security and because it is so large and visible, defense spending has been the frequent object of both political and academic controversy in the US. The issue which has commanded particular attention in the foreign policy literature concerns the causes of the regular post-war increases in such expenditure. It perhaps reflects the misleading simplicity of the problem that, despite the elegance of theoretical formulations and the sophistication of analytic techniques employed, there is as yet no compelling explanation of the levels of, and rates of change in, military spending in the United States. The question of the domestic consequences of defense outlays has also been occasionally addressed, although frequently from an excessively doctrinaire perspective and with results barely more conclusive than those concerning its determinants.
Our first task in this paper will be to account for variations in US military spending during the past three decades. We begin by providing a brief assessment of the extant analytical frameworks bearing on this issue. Following that, we construct an alternative, though partly complementary, explanatory structure of our own. Specifically, we examine the proposition that variations in defense spending arise from political consideration which are related to real and desired conditions within the national economy. Finally, we ask how successfully military spending functions as a tool of macro-economic policy as far as the reduction of unemployment is concerned.
Compulsion or impulsion?
Two principal types of explanation have been advanced to account for changing military expenditures: the first relies primarily on influences exogenous to the nation, the second focuses on internal considerations.
Most writers in the first tradition rely, to a greater or lesser extent, on the well known and pioneering work of Lewis Richardson' who presented the first formal statement of the dynamics of arms races. In a model combining intuitive plausibility and theoretical parsimony, he suggested that the driving force behind fluctuations in military spending was the continuous and apparently ineluctable process of action and reaction between two rival nations. The model was cast in the form of linear differential equations from which equilibrium conditions were deduced.
Richardson's thought has dominated the arms race literature and is unlikely to be completely abandoned in the near future. There are, neverthelss, problems with this perspective. We are, first of all, aware of no compelling empirical evidence that has been adduced in support of the 'action-reaction' hypothesis. Furthermore, the model pays little attention to the matter of how actual decisions are made or to the institutional procedures surrounding them. Thus, we are told nothing of the actors and interests involved, or of the perceptions and motivations of the relevant parties. This latter shortcoming is at least partly remedied by the second of the two major perspectives on military expenditures, as it relies primarily on certain organizational dynamics within the state. The basic idea is that the decision to acquire additional military resources is imbedded in an organizational and bureaucratic setting.2 The complexity of the decisionmaking process will lead to the establishment of routinized practices, the choice of predictable figures for budgetary requests (which tend to be a simple function of past requests), and just as predictable congressional modifications of the original figures. Regularity over time is the outcome; as a result, the best predictor of new increments to military expenditure are simply those which obtained in the immediate past.3
Attempts at explicitly evaluating the relative performance of the two contending approaches tend, in general, to favor the second one. Charles Ostrom (1977) recently conducted a quantitative study of the respective predictive powers of the two models in the context of US-Soviet defense spending. On the basis of the results of an econometric analysis, that author found it very difficult to distinguish empirically the two types of effects. The bulk of the evidence is, however, more conclusive. Albert Wohlstetter, on the basis of arguments presented in two articles (1974a, b), has concluded that: 'The iron law that is supposed to govern strategic action (for Every Action, there is An Opposing Equal or Greater-than-Equal Reaction) is made in fact of plastic' (1974b, p. 49). One of the present authors, in a study that sought to deal with many of the problems of previous investigations of the Richardsonian paradigm, found little evidence to lend support to the 'action-reaction' hypothesis. However, using a fairly elaborate model of the internal processes of the state, he found support for the notion that organizational and fiscal factors play an important role in generating arms level changes. (See Cusack, 1978.) A recent study by Kenneth Organski, Jacek Kugler, and Daniel Fox (1978), which statistically compared the performance of the two models as far as US and Soviet procurement of strategic arms is concerned, also found exogenous considerations less important than those of a domestic nature.
Thus, it would seem on the basis of extant research that internal considerations have clear causal primacy in accounting for military spending. Yet even here we have ample reason to be dissatisfied with the existing propositional framework and knowledge claims. On purely empirical grounds, the paradigm suggests a temporal continuity devoid of abrupt changessomething clearly inconsistent with the historical record. The time-series plot of both absolute levels of defense spending in the United States during the past several decades and of annual changes in these levels (see Fig. 1 The major problem, from our point of view, is simply that the range of theoretical considerations addressed has so far been excessively narrow. Despite the plausibility of the postulated effects of organizational and bureaucratic politics, we find it hard to believe that this is all there is to domestic influences. The primary need might be for new avenues of inquiry: and we shall propose one which relies on the conjunction of political and economic forces in explaining US defense spending.
3. An alternative approach Before we can advance our own, statistically verifiable propositions, a number of considerations must be introduced for control purposes. Contemporary research has, as noted above, suggested that a useful predictor of fluctuations in defense spending is given by the simple autoregressive process whereby current changes are a function of those in the immediate past. We therefore accept as a first hypothesis introduced for control purposes that:
(1) 6(mt)/6(Amt _ 1) >0, where Amt is the change in the real value of US defense spending between the past and the current year,5 and Amt-1 is the change in the real value of US defense spending between the past year and the year preceding it. An additional variable which should be introduced for purposes of statistical control is US involvement or non-involvement in an armed conflict claiming its military resources. While the self-evident nature of this consideration might account for its neglect in much empirical research, we feel that it would be rash, from a statistical point of view at least, not to include it in an explanatory schema. An additional proposition is therefore the following:
(2) a(Awt/awt>0, where w reflects the extent of US war involvement in the year t. A glance at Fig. 1 suggests that increases in military expenditures are not of a uniform level for the entire duration of the wars. During both the Korean and the Vietnam wars, initially very high increases were followed by very low increments for the rest of the wars' durations. On inductive examination, it appeared that the large increases occur during the first two years of the war, diminishing thereafter. Thus, a peak in the size of annual increases is reached after two years (or was, in any case, for these two wars); a period which seems to correspond to the time necessary to mobilize and deploy forces for limited conventional warfare. Before and after the peak, however, changes seem to proceed exponentially (albeit in different directions). Without the guidance of any formal theory of the process of conventional wartime mobilization, but with some inductive experimentation,6 we conjectured that the process could be represented by a function of the following simple exponential form: (3) wt = c X ? (t,--t) where, t, is the current war year (e.g., t, = 3 if this 'is the third year since the beginning of the war), There is therefore reason to believe that elected officials in the United States perceive the relevance of economic fluctuations to their political fortunes and, as a consequence, attempt to act on them with the specific aim of affecting the timing of the business cycle. The second of our four questions seems also to merit an affirmative answer. Furthermore, if military spending has, as some claim, a significant economic impact in the US, then these expenditures might also be partly accounted for by such domestic political considerations. The next question to address then concerns the impact of defense spending on economic performance.
What can we say about the effects of military outlays on national economic conditions? The basic proposition underlying much of the written work on this issue is the simple Keynesian statement that recessions occur when aggregate demand within the economy falls short of productive capacity. The consequence of this is inventory accumulation, unemployment, and sluggish or negative growth. As private consumption and especially investment are usually insufficient to maintain an adequate level of aggregate demand, there is a need to increase this demand through governmental expenditures for goods and services. In a 'mixed economy', military expenditures are considered by some to be rather well suited In a bivariate relation, where the dependent variable is represented byitsnatural logarithm and the independent variable by its absolute value, it can be demonstrated that the regression coefficient (multiplied by 100) may be interpreted as approximating the percentage change in the former associated with a unit change in the latter. In other words, 8 may be interpreted as (AEt/Et) / Amt.1 In the present formulation Amt is of the magnitude of one million dollars measured in real terms.
A preliminary estimation using ordinary least squares yielded considerable firstorder autocorrelation (DW = 0.62). We therefore reestimated the model using the Cochran-Orcutt iterative procedure. The results are displayed in Table I . While the expressed great concern about the way the economy was then acting... Burns' conclusion was that unless some decisive governmental action were taken, and taken soon, we were heading for another dip, which would hit its low point in October, just before the elections. He urged strongly that everything be done to avert this development. He urgently recommended that two steps be taken immediately: by loosening up credit and, where justifiable, by increasing spending for national security. The next time I saw the President, I discussed Burns' proposals with him and he in turn put the subject on the agenda for the next Cabinet meeting. [our italics] Although endorsed by Nixon, Burn's suggestion eventually did not prevail -apparently because the economic situation was not deemed perilous enough. Yet the potential utility of such methods was clearly perceived -even in an administration noted for its conservative approach to fiscal and macroeconomic questions.
If our line of reasoning is substantially correct, one would expect to see particularly high growth in levels of defense spending in the years preceding on-year elections. This would be due to a vigorous attempt by the incumbents at promoting economic expansion, and thus an increase in income and employment levels, at a time when this seems politically most beneficial. In the years following the election, we would expect decelerating rates of military growth as the electoral incentive is temporarily removed (and as considerations of inflation take precedence). During the four-year period between two on-year elections we would therefore expect that changes in defense spending would, ceteris paribus, manifest a cyclical pattern marked by early deceleration and later acceleration. This follows from two assumptions. First, military expenditures are a useful way of acting on aggregate demand and hence of pursuing stabilization policies.'2 Secondly, politicians, who are dealing with an economy constrained by a tradeoff (or the appearance of such) between unemployment and inflation, and facing an electorate for whom growth and employment in the most recent period is paramount, will distribute the terms of the tradeoff in such a way as to derive the greatest political benefit. Approaching on-year elections will lead to expansionary policies; but, following an election, the need to promote growth and full employment will be replaced by a need to curb inflation generated by the previous expansionary decisions.'3 This retrenchment cannot be implemented overnight, yet the shift should be noticeable. Formally then: To recapitulate, we predicted that the change in military spending which had occurred during the previous year would be an important determinant of the change occurring in the present year; the process of wartime mobilization would generate changes of an exponential form; the time separating t from the nearest on-year election would affect spending such that deceleration would occur toward the beginning of the cycle and acceleration would occur toward the end of the four-year period; finally, changes in aggregate private demand would call forth an opposite change in military spending. Bringing together inequalities 1, 2, 5 and 6, we obtain the following predictive model for changes in US military expenditures: 
Statistical results
The results of a statistical estimation of the model and its parameters are presented in Table II . The general and encouraging con- Russett, 1970) . War increases the military effort; and, while this increase tapers off progressively, the level of post-war spending will be significantly greater than that in the pre-war period (ceteris paribus).
More relevant to our immediate concerns are the other results. The electoral coefficient's sign is in the predicted direction and its magnitude is nearly twice that of its standard error. Thus, military spending certainly seems to fluctuate in accordance with the swing of the electoral cycle. Military spending is cut back at an expected rate of $2 billion per-annum after on-year elections and expanded at a similar rate in the two years prior to those elections -again, other things being equal.
The sign of the coefficient for fluctuations in aggregate private demand is in the predicted direction, indicating an expected $60 million dollar increase in defense spending resulting from a $1 billion dollar decline in private consumption and investment. A corresponding increase in private demand would call forth an expected decrease in military spending under ceteris paribus conditions. The estimated coefficient is, however, quite unstable: in fact, a 90 % confidence interval would place it somewhere between 0.015 and -0.14 (although it is centered on --0.061).
Since we are dealing with time series data, we should be concerned with the problem of autocorrelation among the residualswhich might vitiate some of our statistical findings. As we have a lagged endogenous variable in our set of predictor variables, a Durbin-Watson statistic is not an appropriate measure of serial correlation and so we relied on the Durbin's h statistic instead (see Johnston, 1972 , pp. 309-313). The value of this statistic (0.84) indicates that first order autocorrelation is unlikely to be a problem. A visual examination of higher order autocorrelation coefficients suggested no other autoregressive or moving average process among the errors.
In sum, we believe that our model of changes in US defense spending does a good job. We are able to account for over 70 % of the variance, and most of our variables perform very well. In addition, the set of findings for total military spending (net of transfers and interest payments) holds generally across the major categories of this spending effort. In Table III and Table IV , we present the results from analyses of the two principal components of defense spending: spending for capital goods items (purchases of equipment and facilities) and labor items (compensation of military and civilian employees).1s
The model is able to account for 52 % of the variance in capital goods purchases and 72 % of the variance in direct personnel expenditures. More interesting are the coefficient estimates. The lagged dependent variable's coefficient in the equation for capital expenditures is not highly significant, though in the predicted direction. In the second equation, this same variable performs considerably better. The obvious conclusion is that spending on compensation of personnel is not very volatile across time (indeed it seems to follow a predictable and steady upward pro- (In fact, the reverse result for the 'organizational' variable is a natural corollary to this finding.) Our model therefore predicts not only to aggregate defense purchases of goods and services, but, with some slight differences, to purchases for each category separately. After taking up the question of the impact of defense spending for employment within the US economy, we shall return to a further discussion of the meaning of our findings.
The domestic impact of defense spend-
ing: the case of unemployment It might be useful at this stage to assess how beneficial military spending actually is in terms of its domestic impact. We have presented some rudimentary evidence suggesting that defense expenditures are associated with growth in national income. Our measure of national income was GNP per capita (expressed in real terms), i. e. the total dollar value of goods produced and 110 NinciciCusack services rendered within the US economy divided by the size of the nation's population.
GNP per capita is of course a simple and widely reported statistic and as such is one to which voters can easily relate and respond. Its impact, furthermore, seems to lie in its fluctuations rather than its levels (a reflection, according to James Tobin, of the fact that 'a first derivative mentality is strong in American politics' (1974, p. 20) .
A number of caveats should be provided with respect to this measure of national economic performance. It provides, first of all, no information concerning income distribution and says little about the structural underpinnings of the economy. Furthermore, it tells us nothing about the externalities and opportunity costs associated with the expansion of economic activity.16 However, one thing usually associated with rapid growth in national income is a corresponding increase in levels of employment.17 This is in fact one of the beneficial domestic effects most frequently attributed to military spending by its major proponents.18
Estimates vary as to the number of people whose employment is somehow related to the military effort. This dissensus generally follows from disagreements regarding the multiplier effects attendant to military spending. One estimate of the full effect of defense spending on US unemployment is reported by Best and Connolly (1976, pp. 55-56). By their estimates, in CY 1970, with 2.9 million people in the armed forces, 1.2 million civilian employees in the Department of Defense, and 3 million employees in defense industries (principal contractors), a total of 7.1 million people were directly employed through the US defense effort. Added to this, they contend, would be the efforts of the defense multiplier. They argue that for each job created directly by defense spending (in both the public and private sectors), another job will be created in private industry (job multiplier equals one). Thus, by their estimates, the total level of employment attributable to defense spending was over 14 million. Thus, if one adds the 7.9 million unemployed in CY 1970 to the approximately 14 million of Best and Connolly, the total level of unemployment would be some 22 million, or 26 % of the labor force (an unemployment level slightly greater than any experienced at the nadir of the Great Depression). The year 1970, however, was an exceptional year since Vietnam involvement was at its height; a job multiplier of one might also be somewhat inflated. According to the Department of Defense the job multiplier effects may be equal to the more conservative figure of 0.5 in the year of expenditure (1978, p. 102). By this estimate, the employment level attributable to military spending in CY 1970 would equal approximately 10.8 million, and not 14.2 million.
We have estimated the level of employment generated by the military effort for a number of years under different multiplier assumptions. In Table V , row (a) represents the total number of people (in thousands) whose employment is directly accounted for by defense spending, i. e. military personnel, DoD civilian employees, and people employed in defense industries; row (b) provides the sum of the previous figure and a 'conservative' multiplier effect of 0.5; row (c) repeats this for a 'radical' multiplier of unity; row (d) gives the total number of unemployed in the relevant year; rows (e) and (f), respectively, provide the total number of people who would have been unemployed had it not been for defense spending under both multiplier assumptions. Table VI : the obvious conclusion is that defense spending fares rather poorly as a vehicle for job creation. Table VII ). The discrepancy between the two figures for defense related employment is due to the fact that they were computed for different years (the CDS computations are based on 1978 estimates, while those of PIRGIM predate this by several years). Neither study seems to take job multiplier effects into consideration. This, however, would not alter the conclusions very drastically. Even if we were to make the extreme assumption that the military multiplier were equal to one, and that no multiplier effect existed for other categories of spending, defense would rank only second in either Table. Under more plausible assumptions it would do even less well.
Conclusions
The appropriate conclusion seems to be that while defense spending can perform a discernible economic function, this could be somewhat better accomplished by non-military forms of spending, at least as far as employment is concerned. The question is then obvious: why should any reliance be placed on military spending in this context? A first answer is that exclusive reliance is certainly not placed on this sort of expenditure; numerous other ways of stabilizing the economy (e. g., by manipulating the money supply) are available and are used. Nevertheless, defense outlays do seem to have a 112 NinciclCusack number of advantages in this regard, of which we shall list three in particular:20 (1) Independently of its effects in the postwar period, massive government spending generally has not been welcomed by the US public. Defense spending, however, can be rather easily justified to the tax-paying electorate as national security needs can most often be plausibly invoked. (2) Military spending is highly expandable as it does not, like many other forms of government spending, compete directly with private investment. Its supplements but does not supplant the private sector.21 Thus, its expansion will not undermine business confidence -an outcome which would only cut short any upswing. (3) Many military goods have the advantage of possessing a rather short life-span and must be frequently replaced to avert obsolescence. As most of the machinary is specific to a given type of armament, it must be replaced almost as frequently as the final product. The scope for capital purchases is thus quite large.
Furthermore, despite the considerable lag between the time when the development of a new weapon (or other system) is initiated and its actual production, employment and other effects appear from the moment obligations are first incurred. From that moment, orders are placed, subcontracting agreements can be signed, hiring gets underway, and so forth.22 Thus, results are produced quite rapidly. Also, politicans can in many instances control these effects rather well. While the influence of elected officials is obviously greatest at the stage of appropriations, they can also influence the timing of actual obligations and even spending -e.g., via the Chief Executive's control of the O.M.B.
These are all compelling advantages for an incumbent despite the restricted value of this tool of macroeconomic policy. They seem to demonstrate that policy is neither the art of the optimal nor of the possible, but primarily the practice of the expedient.
It is thus possible to explain the dual 6. We believe that the basically a-theoretical nature of this measure is justified by our interest in including wartime mobilization exclusively for purposes of statistical control. We do not attempt to explain its progression. 12. By manipulating military spending, a government is acting on aggregate demand. While this is a major part of regulatory macroeconomic policy, it might be less appropriate for small and open economies (such as those of Western Europe) than it is for the US economy. Assar Lindbeck (1976), for example, suggests that instead of acting on aggregate demand, the following alternatives are available: (1) policies designed to influence relative prices, (2) market-improving and mobility-increasing policies, (3) managing supply, and, (4) 'selective demand management'. For this reason, military spending should not be expected to play a similar role in most other industrialized democracies as it does in the US.
13. To quote Lindbeck (1976, p. 13) again, 'the government will usually cut back aggregate demand after the election in order to bring down the rate of inflation, to squeeze out inflationary expectations and hence to shift down the short-term Phillips curve, as well as to reduce deficits in the current account, well in time before the next election, so that new expansionary actions can again be undertaken before that election.' See also Nordhaus (1975 22. The same effect may, to a certain extent, be achieved through simple obligation as by actual expenditures (Greenberg 1967 , Lee 1970 ), a matter to which governments appear oblivious.
